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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 206955

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, CSCE

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SUBJECT: SOVIET CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

REF: (A) MOSCOW 12022

-- (B) STATE 191133

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES EMBASSY'S ANNIVERSARY ROUNDUP ON SOVIET CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. CONTINUED CLOSE MONITORING OF SOVIET ACTIONS AND ANALYSIS OF TRENDS WILL BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN THE PERIOD UP TO THE BELGRADE MEETING.

2. OVERALL SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CSCE APPEARS TO HAVE VARIED LITTLE FROM THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS PURSUED BY THEM DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT REALIZE THAT THE CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION PHASE IS A FORM OF EXTENDED NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THEIR OVERALL OBJECTIVE CONTINUES TO BE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CSCE AS A WATERSHED EVENT WHICH WILL INFLUENCE ALL ASPECTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE IN DIRECTIONS FAVORABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. IN WORKING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF CSCE PROVISIONS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME JUDGING HOW FAR THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO GO IN TERMS OF BASKET III IMPLEMENTATION IN ORDER TO SATISFY AT LEAST A MAJOR SECTOR OF WESTERN PUBLIC

OPINION AND THUS AVERT THE RECRIMINATIONS THEY FEAR IN BELGRADE. THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF CRITICISM OF WESTERN IMPLEMENTATION AND DEFENSE OF SOVIET PRACTICES FORMS PART OF THIS BROAD STRATEGY. IT APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE SPOTTY SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND, LIKE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS IN CSCE ITSELF, TO DISCOURAGE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND PRESS FROM CRITICIZING THE SOVIETS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY GRINDING DOWN WESTERN EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS CAN "REALISTICALLY" BE EXPECTED TO DO IN RESPONSE TO BASKET III.

3. THE SOVIET TECHNIQUE OF MAKING A FEW CONCESSIONS, FOLLOWED BY A LONG PERIOD OF IMMOBILITY, ALSO RECALLS SOVIET TACTICS DURING CSCE, AND IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OVERALL STRATEGY. THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO TIME FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION STEPS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO HAVE

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MAXIMUM IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT THAT JOURNALISTS MAY APPLY DIRECTLY TO SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR INTERVIEWS, A STEP WHICH RELATES TO A SPECIFIC CSCE PROVISION, MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED TO INFLUENCE JOURNALISTS ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST HELSINKI ANNIVERSARY. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIETS MAY TIME FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES BEFORE KEY MEETINGS AT WHICH CSCE

IS LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED. (NATO MINISTERIALS IN DECEMBER AND MAY ARE POSSIBILITIES.) AS EMBASSY MOSCOW SUGGESTS, SOVIETS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY SAVE SOME IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR PERIOD JUST PRIOR TO BELGRADE MEETINGS NEXT YEAR. GIVEN THE PRESENCE OF KOVALEV AND LIPATTI, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE RECENT MEETING OF WARSAW PACT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SOFIA DISCUSSED THESE TACTICS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE.

4. OUR EXPERIENCE DURING CSCE SUGGESTS THAT ONLY CONSISTENT, PATIENT INSISTENCE ON MEANINGFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FINAL ACT, SUPPORTED UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL WESTERN STATES, WILL LEAD THE SOVIETS TOWARD THE CONCLUSION THAT THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES WILL BE SERVED BEST BY IMPLEMENTING IN A MEANINGFUL WAY THOSE HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS WHICH ARE OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE WEST. THIS HAS BEEN OUR APPROACH SINCE HELSINKI AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE IT, RECOGNIZING THAT THE DEADLINE OF THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WILL IMPOSE A CERTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE POSITIVE MOVES BEFORE JUNE, 1977. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THIS POLICY OVER A FAIRLY LONG PERIOD IF CONTINUED PROGRESS IS TO BE REALIZED.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, IN EVALUATING SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III WE SHOULD LOOK CLOSELY AT RECENT SOVIET RECORD ON FAMILY-RELATED QUESTIONS, A SUBJECT TO WHICH PUBLICISTS SUCH AS ZHUKOV WILL NOT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS DEVOTE MUCH ATTENTION IN DOMESTIC PRESS AND MEDIA. A FEW EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL SOVIET RECORD SUGGEST THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA:

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A. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ISSUANCE OF EXIT VISAS FOR PRIVATE VISITS TO RELATIVES IN US IS RUNNING OVER 40 PERCENT ABOVE 1975 RATE. TOTALS FOR 1975 AND 1974 HAD BOTH BEEN SLIGHTLY OVER 1,000 AND THE MARKED INCREASE SEEMS CSCE RELATED.

B. ISSUANCE OF EXIT VISAS FOR EMIGRATION TO US IS DOUBLE 1975 RATE. WHILE, AS EMBASSY HAS POINTED OUT, ALMOST ALL THIS INCREASE IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO ARMENIAN EMIGRATION, THE STATISTICS ARE NEVERTHELESS IMPRESSIVE. (WE ALSO UNDERSTAND EMIGRATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS TO FRG HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY AND MAY BE MORE THAN DOUBLE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL.)

C. THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ISSUED A VISITOR

VISA TO A RECENT SOVIET EMIGRANT TO VISIT HER DYING MOTHER IN KIEV. THE EMIGRANT HAD DEPARTED THE USSR WITH AN EXIT VISA FOR ISRAEL AND IS THEREFORE NOT A SOVIET CITIZEN. THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S ACTION IN THIS CASE MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM PAST SOVIET PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH VISITS.

6. AS NOTED REF B, WE WILL BE PREPARING A NEW GENERAL PRESENTATION ON CSCE FOR USE BY THE EMBASSY AT A SOMEWHAT LATER DATE, FOLLOWING UP ON THE MAY 3 PRESENTATION BY KORNIYENKO. WE ARE CURRENTLY AIMING FOR A PRESENTATION IN SEPTEMBER, AND WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN PARA 8 OF REF A IN THE PREPARATION OF OUR NEW DEMARCHE. IN THE MEANWHILE, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO USE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 8 OF REF A IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN OFFICIALS.

ROBINSON

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